

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 004401
ORIGIN ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 NSC-05 SS-15 PM-04 SP-02 ERDA-05
CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07 IO-13 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01
PA-01 PRS-01 SAJ-01 TRSE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00
USIE-00 INRE-00 /084 R

DRAFTED BY ACDA/IR/REG:LFISCHER
APPROVED BY ACDA/IR:LSLOSS
NSC:SHADLEY S/S:RGAMBLE
JCS:WFORRELL
OSD/ISA:JWADE
PM/DCA:LBRECKON
EUR/RPM:JHAWES
C:JMONTGOMERY
S/P:PKAPLAN
ACDA/IR:LFISCHER

-----080345Z 110831 /70

O R 080248Z JAN 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR
USCINCEUR

S E C R E T STATE 004401

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS:PARM, NATO

SUBJECT:MBFR: AHG REQUEST ON NUCLEAR OFFER

REFS: A. NATO 6915 (DTG 171901Z DEC 76)
B. MBFR VIENNA 623 (DTG 160904Z DEC 76)
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 004401

1. WE DO NOT FAVOR A GENERAL RELEASE TO THE AHG OF
PARAS 7-10 OF CM(75)74 OR OF PARAS 10 AND 17 OF CM(75)75
FOR USE WITH THE EAST. FROM A TACTICAL STANDPOINT, WE
BELIEVE THAT ROUND 11 OF MBFR SHOULD FOCUS ON COUNTING
RULES.

2. HOWEVER, AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF WESTERN PRESS REPORTS ON US AIRCRAFT MODERNIZATION PLANS, A BRIEF CONFIRMATION THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF US NUCLEAR CAPABLE F-4S WOULD RESULT IN A LIMITATION ON ALL US AIRCRAFT OF NUCLEAR-CAPABLE MODELS MAY BE USEFUL TACTICALLY. A WESTERN RELUCTANCE TO CONFIRM THIS POINT MIGHT TEND TO UNDERMINE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE WESTERN NUCLEAR OFFER.

3. THEREFORE, WE BELIEVE THAT THE AHG SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED TO DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE. BEGIN TEXT: "IF

EASTERN NEGOTIATORS AGAIN RAISE THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE LIMITATION RESULTING FROM US F-4 WITHDRAWALS WOULD APPLY TO US AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN THE F-4, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD STATE THAT THE REDUCTIONS OF US NUCLEAR-CAPABLE F-4S PROPOSED BY THE WEST IN DECEMBER 1975 WOULD RESULT IN A NUMERICAL LIMITATION ON THE AGGREGATE TOTAL OF ALL US AIRCRAFT OF NUCLEAR-CAPABLE MODELS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THE NUMBER OF SUCH US AIRCRAFT IN THE AREA COULD NOT EXCEED THE NUMBER IN THE AREA FOLLOWING PHASE I REDUCTIONS, WITH SUITABLE EXCEPTIONS TO PERMIT NORMAL TRAINING AND EXERCISES. IF THE EAST PRESSES FURTHER, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS MAY STATE THAT THE NUMERICAL LIMITATION WOULD APPLY FOR EXAMPLE TO NUCLEAR CAPABLE MODELS OF THE US F-16 IF SUCH AIRCRAFT MODELS ARE DEPLOYED TO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. IF THE EAST SEEKS STILL FURTHER DETAILS ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD ANSWER THAT THESE QUESTIONS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED LATER." END TEXT.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 004401

4. IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ALLIES OF AHG REQUEST, ACTION ADDRESSEES MAY DRAW ON FOLLOWING WASHINGTON VIEWS.

5. THE NUCLEAR OFFER WAS TABLED WITH SEVERAL BASIC GOALS IN MIND, INCLUDING: TO HELP ACHIEVE ASYMMETRICAL EASTERN REDUCTIONS IN MANPOWER LEADING TO THE OBJECTIVE OF APPROXIMATE PARITY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST IN THE FORM OF A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING; TO HELP OBTAIN WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY; TO PROMOTE CONCEPT OF MIXED PACKAGE REDUCTIONS; AND TO ENSURE THAT LIMITATIONS OF EQUIPMENT APPLY ONLY TO SELECTED EQUIPMENT OF US AND SOVIET FORCES, AND NOT TO NON-US NATO FORCES. TO DATE, WE HAVE NOT RECEIVED RESPONSES FROM EAST INDICATING ACCEPTANCE OF ANY OF THESE GOALS. AHG'S REQUEST TO CLARIFY FURTHER THE NATO NUCLEAR OFFER SHOULD BE VIEWED AGAINST MEASURING ROD OF POTENTIAL USEFULNESS IN OBTAINING MORE FORTHCOMING EASTERN RESPONSES TO THESE NATO GOALS.

6. WE BELIEVE THAT BY FOCUSING EARLY DISCUSSION ON MANPOWER COUNTING RULES AND DEFINITIONS, NEGOTIATORS ARE IN A BETTER TACTICAL POSITION TO AVOID PROVIDING THE EAST AN OPPORTUNITY TO OPEN UP A DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE FORMULATION OR OPERATION OF LIMITATIONS. AN UNSTRUCTURED DISCUSSION OF EQUIPMENT LIMITATIONS COULD, FOR INSTANCE, INVITE PREMATURE EASTERN QUESTIONS ABOUT DEFINITIONS OF NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT OR MISSILE LAUNCHERS OTHER THAN PERSHING. IT COULD ALSO GIVE THE EAST AN OPENING TO PRESS ITS ARGUMENTS FOR LIMITING NON-US ALLIED EQUIPMENT. IT IS OUR VIEW THAT DISCUSSION OF

THESE ISSUES NOW COULD IMPEDE, NOT AID, PROGRESS TOWARD OUR NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES. WE APPRECIATE THE REASONING BEHIND THE AHG REQUEST FOR RELEASE OF FURTHER PROVISIONS OF CM(75)74 AND CM(75)75 BUT WOULD PREFER TO CONTINUE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 004401

TO REVIEW THE MATTER AS THE NEGOTIATIONS PROCEED.

7. WHILE MAINTAINING THE PRIMARY FOCUS ON COUNTING RULES IN ROUND 11, WE WOULD ALSO WANT TO BE CONSISTENT IN OUR PURSUIT OF THE OBJECTIVES MENTIONED IN PARA 5 ABOVE. FOR EXAMPLE, WE HAVE NOTED SOVIET QUESTIONS IN DECEMBER 7 AND 15 INFORMALS ABOUT LIMITATIONS ON NON-TANK EQUIPMENT. THESE QUESTIONS MAY PRESENT AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE WEST TO PROBE SOVIET READINESS TO ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE THAT REDUCTIONS OF AND LIMITATIONS ON ARMAMENTS SHOULD BE LIMITED TO SELECTED US AND SOVIET ARMAMENTS TO BE AGREED, RATHER THAN THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH PROPOSED IN INITIAL EASTERN PROPOSALS. ALLIED POSITION ON THOSE SELECTED ARMAMENTS TO BE REDUCED AND LIMITED, BY US AND SOVIETS, IS DEFINED IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR DECEMBER 1975 MIXED PACKAGE OFFER, AND THIS POSITION REMAINS UNCHANGED. SHOULD SOVIETS DEMONSTRATE POTENTIAL WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THE WESTERN PRINCIPLE DESCRIBED ABOVE, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER WHETHER TO DRAW FURTHER ON CM(75)74 AND CM(75)75 IN DISCUSSING SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET AND US EQUIPMENT WITH A VIEW TOWARD GAINING THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE MIXED PACKAGE CONCEPT.
KISSINGER

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TROOP DEPLOYMENT, AIRCRAFT, INFORMATION CONTROL, COMMITTEES, NUCLEAR FORCES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 08-Jan-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE004401
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: LFISCHER
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770008-0010
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770169/aaaachvs.tel
Line Count: 163
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: e403b7db-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN ACDA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 77 NATO BRUSSELS 6915, 77 MBFR VIENNA 623
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 26-Oct-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3637346
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: AHG REQUEST ON NUCLEAR OFFER
TAGS: PARM, XG, US, NATO, MBFR
To: NATO BRUSSELS MBFR VIENNA
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/e403b7db-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009